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Article 
Hurting More than Helping: 
How the Marshall Islands’ Seeming Bravery 
Against Major Powers Only Stands to Maim the 
Legitimacy of the World Court 
Katherine Maddox Davis 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As Greenpeace and a contingency of world leaders laud the 
Marshall Islands’ legal crusade against nuclear weapons states, 
the cases themselves appear mostly dead on arrival.1 Of nine ICJ 
suits filed against the nuclear weapons states, six never 
progressed for lack of jurisdiction.2 Of the remaining three, legal 
arguments are attenuated against India and Pakistan as non-
parties to the NPT and the proceedings on the merits against the 
United Kingdom are presently suspended for deliberation on 
preliminary objections.3 
The potential ramifications of the Marshall Islands’ legal 
indiscretion extend beyond these immediate legal losses. The 
legal action may jeopardize the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction 
over the only submitting major powers, India and the United 
 
  Law Clerk, United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia. J.D., Emory University School of Law, 2015; M.Sc., University of 
Oxford, 2012; B.A., Auburn University, 2010. The author gives warmest thanks 
to Professor Johan D. van der Vyver for his expert mentorship.  
 1. Professor Julian Ku characterized the proceedings as “[m]ostly just 
grandstanding by a very small nation with the help of a savvy (but sloppy) US 
law firm.” See Julian Ku, Marshall Islands Sues to Enforce Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty; U.K. May Be Dragged into ICJ, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 24, 
2014, 2:48 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/04/24/marshall-islands-sues-
enforce-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-uk-may-dragged-icj/. 
 2. See infra Section II(B)(2). 
 3. In an American federal district court, an additional suit against the 
United States was dismissed and is now on appeal before the Ninth Circuit. See 
infra Section II(A). 
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Kingdom.4 Among probable outcomes to the Marshall Islands’ 
suits, the ICJ will be forced to draw attention to its anemic 
authority, and major powers may be prompted to withdraw from 
compulsory jurisdiction. In a lamentable irony, the Marshall 
Islands’ suits stand to do more damage to the ICJ’s legitimacy 
than positively impact nuclear disarmament. 
This Article contends that submission to compulsory 
jurisdiction is the gold standard of the ICJ’s legitimacy. That 
submission is what the Marshall Islands now threaten. India is 
already taking steps identical to the United States’ first actions 
before withdrawing its submission.5 The United Kingdom 
altered its agreement of jurisdiction with the ICJ, seemingly to 
block this very case, and has already begun to challenge the 
proceedings, though the grounds of its challenge are not yet 
public.6 The most probable outcome of the Marshall Islands’ 
action is not that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) will 
be more strictly enforced, but that the Marshall Islands’ 
applications will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (conceding 
how little authority the ICJ has), or that India and/or the United 
Kingdom will follow the example of China, France, and the 
United States in revoking submission to the ICJ’s opt-in 
provision to compulsory jurisdiction, known as the Optional 
Clause.7 Either of the probable outcomes could decrease the 
legitimacy of the ICJ, ominously continuing a downward trend 
nearly a century in the running.8 The Marshall Islands’ self-
 
 4. While the same may be true for Pakistan, this Article focuses on India 
and the United Kingdom because the major powers’ withdrawals would have a 
greater impact on the legitimacy of the ICJ. For purposes of this work, ‘major 
powers’ will be defined by economic productivity. According to the World Bank, 
the ten largest national economies by GDP in 2014 were the United States, 
China, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Italy, Russia, and 
India. See World Bank, Gross Domestic Product 2014, in WORLD DEVELOPMENT 
INDICATORS 1 (2015), http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf. 
Pakistan’s GDP was ranked forty-third. Id. 
 5. See infra Section VI. 
 6. See infra Section II(B)(1). See Obligations Concerning Negotiations 
Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament 
(Marsh. Is. v. U.K.), Order (June 19), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket
/files/160/18710.pdf. ICJ rules maintain that pleadings may not be made public, 
if at all, until the oral proceedings stage. Rules of the International Court of 
Justice, 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 6, at art. 53(2) (“The Court may, after 
ascertaining the views of the parties, decide that copies of the pleadings and 
documents annexed shall be made accessible to the public on or after the 
opening of the oral proceedings.”) [hereinafter Rules of Court]. 
 7. See infra Section III. 
 8. See infra Section III(A). 
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lauded efforts may backfire in the face of everything that 
proponents of public international law sought to achieve in the 
past century. 
This Article proceeds with background information on the 
NPT, laying ground to assess the legal merits of the Marshall 
Islands’ arguments. Section II summarizes the Marshall Islands’ 
action thus far in U.S. federal court and before the ICJ, 
analyzing the strategies for short- and long-term success. 
Ironically, Section II finds greater long-term potential in 
American courts than before the ICJ. Section III assesses the 
waning authority of the ICJ, and Section IV recounts the 
manners in which China, France, and the United States 
withdrew from the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction.  
Taking cues from past circumstances of withdrawal, 
Sections V and VI assess the likelihood that the United Kingdom 
and India, respectively, will throw off compulsory jurisdiction in 
the wake of the Marshall Islands’ legal campaign. Attention is 
first given to procedural bars, rooted in Optional Clause 
declarations, then to the legal merits in the event that the 
procedure is deemed permissible, and finally to the likelihood of 
revoking submission to the Optional Clause. 
Section V finds that procedure seems on the United 
Kingdom’s side, though a yet-tested reservation could be a wild 
card, and that if the United Kingdom acts as the United States 
did, the state will withdraw its Optional Clause declaration if it 
loses on procedure; that the ICJ would be hard pressed to find 
against the United Kingdom on the merits; and that overall, the 
United Kingdom would have little to lose by withdrawing its 
declaration.  
Section VI finds more questions than answers in the Indian 
case, though none would help the reputation of the ICJ, and any 
may lead India to consider withdrawing from the Optional 
Clause. The question of jurisdiction in the Indian case is any 
state’s game, as India has seen mixed success in recent attempts 
to argue lack of ICJ jurisdiction based upon its Optional Clause 
reservations.9 The Marshall Islands’ legal arguments against 
India fall dismally flat in light of India’s lack of affiliation with 
the NPT.10 However, due to India’s ongoing proliferation of 
nuclear weapons technology, even a perceived loss of 
invincibility before the ICJ may spook India into withdrawing 
 
 9. See infra Section VI(A). 
 10. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, infra note 17. 
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from the Optional Clause should the ICJ incorrectly find 
jurisdiction. India may be particularly calculated because of its 
present campaign for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security 
Council, though such a procedural long shot may not be worth 
compromising in the present case.11  
Even if either case reaches judgment without prompting the 
withdrawal of a major power, the likelihood of enforcement is 
nearly non-existent;12 thus, legitimacy will be inevitably 
siphoned from the ICJ. Ultimately, this Article finds little long-
term merit in the Marshall Islands’ strategy, and great potential 
loss for the ICJ as the hapless victim of its own idealism. 
A. THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 
As a threshold matter, the murky language of the NPT 
handicaps the merits of the Marshall Islands’ arguments. At the 
time of the treaty’s negotiation, the five major victors of World 
War II maintained operational nuclear weapons.13 The NPT 
came into force in 1970 as a major compromise between these 
states and non-weapons states.14 Given the ongoing spoils of 
victor’s justice, such as permanent U.N. Security Council seats, 
other nations were hesitant to allow the five nuclear weapons 
states further opportunities to permanently entrench their 
power.15 India, Israel, Pakistan, and the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) each developed and tested nuclear 
weapons after the treaty came into force.16 However, the treaty 
restricts the title of “nuclear weapons state” to those countries 
that tested weapons prior to January 1, 1967.17 The latecomers’ 
 
 11. Adding a permanent member to the Security Council would require 
amending the United Nations Charter, which would require a majority vote of 
all member states. See U.N. Charter art. 108. Such a feat is highly unlikely. 
 12. See infra Section III(A). 
 13. See REBECCA JOHNSON, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE NEGOTIATION OF 
THE CTBT AND THE END OF NUCLEAR TESTING 2 (U.N. Institute for 
Disarmament Research ed., 2009). 
 14. See Nobuyasu Abe, The Current Problems of the NPT: How to 
Strengthen the Non-Proliferation Regime, in THE NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION TREATY AND INDIA 38 (Rajiv Nayan ed., 2012). 
 15. See generally Leonard Weiss, India and the NPT, in THE NUCLEAR 
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND INDIA (Rajiv Nayan ed., 2012) (proposing 
that India must end nuclear testing in order to strengthen non-proliferation). 
 16. See James Conca, The Nuclear Weapons States—Who Has Them and 
How Many, FORBES (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca
/2014/09/25/the-nuclear-weapons-states-who-has-them-and-how-many/. 
 17. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. IX, July 1, 
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only options were to join the NPT as non-weapons states—
tainting the legitimacy of their sophisticated status—or to 
abstain from joining the treaty. Most chose not to join.18 
The three pillars of the NPT are “[n]on-proliferation, 
disarmament, and the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy.”19 
Non-proliferation and disarmament are addressed in NPT 
Article VI—the subject of the Marshall Islands’ suits.20 The right 
to peaceful use of nuclear energy is addressed in Article IV. 
Article VI tentatively calls for an end to the creation of nuclear 
weapons and the beginning of a conversation to destroy existing 
nuclear weapons, and to pen a new treaty for strict control of 
nuclear armaments.21 The language most at issue is the 
commitment to “[u]ndertake[] to pursue negotiations in good 
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear 
arms race at an early date.”22 
Today, the Marshall Islands argue that Article VI has been 
breached because nuclear weapons still exist.23 The Marshall 
Islands opine that the suits are “[n]ot an attempt to re-open the 
question of the legality of nuclear weapons,” but to focus on “[t]he 
failure to fulfill the obligations of customary international law 
with respect to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early 
date and nuclear disarmament enshrined in Article VI of the 
NPT and declared by the Court.”24 As for obligations of custom, 
the battle is damned by the sheer non-existence of the customary 
international law on which the Marshall Islands rests much of 
its case.25 The NPT interpretation is also extreme, as 
 
1968–Mar. 2, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161. 
 18. See Abe, supra note 14, at 38. 
 19. Arvind Gupta, NPT Review Conference 2010: Issues and Prospects, in 
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND INDIA 42 (Rajiv Nayan ed., 
2012). 
 20. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 17, 
at art. VI. See also Application Instituting Proceedings Against the Republic of 
India, infra note 23. 
 21. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 17, 
at art. VI. (“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations 
in good faith . . . on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict 
and effective international control.”). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Application Instituting Proceedings Against the Republic of India, 
Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms 
Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. India), Pleadings, 3 (Apr. 24, 
2014), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/158/18292.pdf. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See, e.g., infra Section II(B). 
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emphasized by attempts of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation—
the organization behind the suits—to name the Marshall 
Islands’ legal action “the Nuclear Zero Lawsuits.”26 
The fuzzy language of Article VI creates an uphill battle 
distinguishing compliance from non-compliance. The 
noncommittal language, “[u]ndertakes to pursue negotiations in 
good faith,” makes the Marshall Islands’ interpretation 
particularly extreme, especially in light of Article IV, which 
condones and even encourages the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy.27 The NPT drafters demonstrated convictions that 
ending nuclear energy entirely was against the interests of 
society.28 Even before the provision on ending the arms race, 
Article IV clarifies: 
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting 
the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to 
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in 
conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty. 
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, 
and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible 
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and 
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy.29 
An “inalienable right” to nuclear research is strong 
language, indeed. Because the treaty leaves “nuclear arms race” 
undefined in Article VI, any nation wishing to parse the legal 
ambiguities of the treaty to fit its needs may conflate conducting 
research and taking up arms. Consequently, the NPT language 
does not position the Marshall Islands to reasonably expect 
success. 
II. THE MARSHALL ISLANDS’ LEGAL STRATEGIES 
Shortly before the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee 
 
 26. See infra Section II(B)(2); NUCLEAR ZERO, www.nuclearzero.org (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2016). 
 27. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 17, 
at art. IV, VI. 
 28. Id. at art. IV. 
 29. Id. 
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meetings, the Marshall Islands filed legal action against all nine 
nuclear weapons states.30 The Marshall Islands’ actions were 
based on assertions that the states are in breach of the NPT’s 
Article VI, calling for an end to the nuclear arms race and for 
general disarmament.31 As explained infra, these arguments are 
particularly attenuated against India, Pakistan, the DPRK, and 
Israel; none of which are parties to the NPT.32 While the 
proceedings have yet to receive extensive news coverage, likely 
because of lengthy ICJ procedures,33 Greenpeace issued a 
statement lauding the nation’s efforts.34 A group of eighty-six 
figures from around the globe permitted their names to appear 
at the bottom of a blog post constituting an ‘open letter’ 
supporting the Marshall Islands’ legal action.35 That the 
 
 30. See Press Release 2014/18, INT’L CT. JUST., The Republic of the 
Marshall Islands Files Applications Against Nine States for Their Alleged 
Failure to Fulfil Their Obligations with Respect to the Cessation of the Nuclear 
Arms Race at an Early Date and to Nuclear Disarmament, (Apr. 25, 2014), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/files/0/18300.pdf. 
 31. See id. at 2–3. 
 32. See id. 
 33. All cases were filed in April 2014. In the ICJ proceedings concerning 
India, for example, the Marshall Islands were given until December 2014 to 
brief the court on jurisdiction, with India’s brief due in September 2015. See 
Press Release 2014/22, INT’L CT. JUST., Obligations Concerning Negotiations 
Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament 
(Marsh. Is. v. India) Fixing of Time-Limits for Filing of Pleadings on the 
Question of Jurisdiction (June 19, 2014), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket
/files/158/18334.pdf; Press Release 2015/14, INT’L CT. JUST., Obligations 
Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and 
to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. India) Extension of the Time-Limit for 
the Filing of India’s Counter-Memorial (June 2, 2015), http://www.icj-cij.org
/docket/files/158/18682.pdf. While no public announcement has been made, the 
author contacted the Marshall Islands’ legal counsel and was privately assured 
that the memorial was filed before the December 2014 deadline (e-mail on file 
with author). Per ICJ rules, memorials will not be made public until the oral 
proceedings stage. See Rules of Court, supra note 6, at art. 53(2). In the case 
against the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom’s counter-memorial was due 
December 16, 2015. See Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to 
Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. 
v. U.K.), Order, 5 (June 16, 2014), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/160
/18342.pdf [hereinafter June 16, 2014 Order]. The United Kingdom filed timely 
preliminary objections to the case in June 2015, suspending procedure on the 
merits. See Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the 
Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. U.K.), Order, 2 
(June 19, 2015), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/160/18710.pdf. Final rulings 
should not be expected soon. 
 34. See Press Release, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Greenpeace 
Champions the Marshall Islands (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.wagingpeace.
org/greenpeace-champions-marshall-islands/. 
 35. See Open Letter in Support of the Marshall Islands’ Nuclear Zero 
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Marshall Islands could have expected these proceedings to lead 
to total disarmament of nuclear weapons is an imaginative 
stretch for even the most idealistic among the disarmament 
movement.36 
Given the Marshall Islands’ willingness to enter domestic 
jurisdiction in the United States, and the weakness of the 
Marshall Islands’ ICJ suit against India, the Marshall Islands 
at least should have attempted an action against India in Indian 
court. Indian state and federal courts are historically welcome 
forums for customary international law arguments.37 At best, 
the Marshall Islands missed an opportunity to show a fuller 
commitment to overturning every stone in seeking nuclear 
disarmament. At worst, the Marshall Islands missed a chance 
for a positive ruling that could have impacted Indian efforts to 
negotiate an end to the arms race. While the Marshall Islands 
may have missed an opportunity in India, the state took a 
fascinating risk in a U.S. court which may provide greater 
dividends for other treaty parties for years to come. 
A. THE MARSHALL ISLANDS’ SUIT IN THE UNITED STATES 
On the same day that the Marshall Islands took legal action 
before the ICJ, the nation filed a complaint against the United 
States in an American federal district court.38 The complaint 
was made on identical grounds to those of the ICJ cases, for 
breach of custom and the NPT Article VI.39 The Marshall Islands 
requested that the court articulate American obligations under 
Article VI, determine whether the United States is in 
compliance, and call for remedial measures in the event of 
noncompliance.40 The United States quickly filed a motion to 
 
Lawsuits, NUCLEAR AGE PEACE FOUND., http://www.wagingpeace.org/rmi-
open-letter/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2016). 
 36. See generally David Kennedy, The Nuclear Weapons Case, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS 462 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999) 
(commenting on the European legal academy’s ICJ idealism). 
 37. See Katherine M. Davis, I, Too, Sing America: Customary International 
Law for American State and Federal Courts’ Post-Kiobel Jurisprudence, Guided 
by Australian and Indian Experiences, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 119, 158–64 
(2014). 
 38. See Complaint at ¶ 1, Republic of the Marsh. Is. v. United States, No. 
14-CV-1885 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2014). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. ¶ 3. 
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dismiss the case on an array of grounds, including lack of 
standing, justiciability, lack of a private cause of action, 
improper venue, and timeliness.41 The parties expanded their 
arguments in additional filings, as did a handful of the Marshall 
Islands’ supporters in amicus briefs.42 
The federal district court was initially scheduled to rule on 
the motion to dismiss in January 2015.43 Before doing so, the 
court made an atypical display of piqued interest. Two days 
early, the court issued a tentative decision granting the United 
States’ motion to dismiss.44 In a tentative order, the court 
dispensed of any desire to hear oral arguments on the merits, 
but expressed a willingness to hear twenty minutes from each 
side on five questions it laid out alongside the tentative ruling.45 
Soon thereafter, the court granted the United States’ motion to 
dismiss.46 
The court found that the Marshall Islands lacked standing 
because the alleged injury was without redress, and the political 
question doctrine rendered the matter nonjusticiable.47 The 
court declined to articulate American obligations under the 
treaty.48 Additional matters relating to right of action, venue, 
 
 41. See Motion to Dismiss at 2, 4, 7, 10, 12, Republic of the Marsh. Is. v. 
United States, No. 14-CV-1885 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2014). 
 42. See Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Republic of the Marsh. Is. v. 
United States, No. 14-CV-1885 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2014); Reply Memorandum 
in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Republic of the Marsh. Is. v. United States, 
No. 14-CV-1885 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2014); Brief of Tri-Valley CAREs as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Venue in the Northern District of California, Republic of 
the Marsh. Is. v. United States, No. 14-CV-1885 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014); Brief 
of Nuclear Watch New Mexico as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff and in 
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Republic of the Marsh. Is. v. 
United States, No. 14-CV-1885 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2014). 
 43. See Notice of Tentative Ruling and Questions at 1, Republic of the 
Marsh. Is. v. United States, No. 14-CV-1885 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2015). 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. at 1, 2. 
 46. See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 1, Republic of the Marsh. Is. 
v. United States, No. 14-CV-1885 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2015). See also Judgment, 
Republic of the Marsh. Is. v. United States, No. 14-CV-1885 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 
2015). 
 47. See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 46, at 5, 7. 
 48. While making no pronouncement, the court did quote the U.S. Senate 
report that accompanied ratification. See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, 
supra note 46, at 2. That report articulated the core purpose of the treaty as 
slowing—not stopping—the spread of nuclear weapons by prohibiting weapon 
states from transferring weapons and prohibiting non-weapon states from 
obtaining nuclear weapons. Id. If this dicta were construed as a full articulation 
of American NPT obligations, the Marshall Islands’ current arguments would 
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and timeliness were not reached.49 To be fair, the Marshall 
Islands had a decent shot at surviving the motion to dismiss, 
given the lack of jurisdiction-specific precedent on the matter.50 
Counsel for the Marshall Islands filed a notice of appeal in April 
2015.51 
While prospects seem dashed for the Marshall Islands in the 
immediate case, the action charted a potentially powerful path 
for other states with stronger treaty breach claims to seek relief 
in American court. The prospect of treaty parties choosing to 
seek a federal district court’s interpretation of treaty obligations 
and assessing whether those obligations are presently met is a 
powerful prospect. This strategy is not new, but has been out of 
vogue for the better part of two centuries. The parties simply 
need to bring action concerning treaties of which the United 
States is actually in breach, and make a clearer argument for 
overcoming the political question doctrine.52 
American treaty breaches are hardly difficult to come by.53 
A variety of U.S. district courts interpreting American treaty 
obligations could highlight the best of American federalism.54 As 
major powers grow increasingly reticent to bring their concerns 
to the International Court of Justice, and the success rate of 
enforcement among major powers remains abysmal, domestic 
courts may see an increase in the volume of international treaty 
 
be negated. 
 49. E.g., Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 46. 
 50. The lack of jurisdiction-specific precedent was evident by both parties’ 
reliance on decisions from other federal district courts. See Motion to Dismiss, 
supra note 41; Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 42; Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 42. The standing 
section of the court’s dismissal order cited only two U.S. Supreme Court cases, 
five Ninth Circuit cases, and five cases from other federal jurisdictions. See 
Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 46, at 3–5. 
 51. See Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal at 1–2, Republic of the Marsh. Is. v. 
United States, No. 14-CV-1885 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2015). 
 52. Complaint at 4, Republic of the Marshall Islands v. United States, No. 
14-CV-01885 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2014). While some may be quick to cite 
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) as a bar to this litigation, that case 
was specific to presidential authority to withdraw from a treaty and does not 
address simply articulating American treaty obligations. If federal courts 
cannot pronounce American obligations under legal instruments, the political 
question doctrine will have regrettably built an end-run to perpetuate American 
exceptionalism in international law. See Katherine Maddox Davis, Promise 
Despite Overreach in Marshall Islands v. United States, 30 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016). 
 53. JOHAN D. VAN DER VYVER, IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
IN THE UNITED STATES 93 (Peter Lang ed., 2010). 
 54. See ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM 164 (2009). 
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issues on their dockets.55 The trend would mesh with the 
growing role of domestic courts in engaging international 
matters like arbitral enforcement.56 In sum, despite the anemic 
merits of the present case, the Marshall Islands may have 
invited a future for American accountability to treaty 
obligations. Once all is said and done before the ICJ, dwelling on 
that glimmer of hope for future American lawsuits may be the 
only way to charitably view the Marshall Islands’ legal 
campaign. 
One modern champion of introducing international law into 
American courts is Justice Stephen Breyer, whose judicial 
philosophies on international law are explored in his Medellin v. 
Texas dissent and echoed in his more recent Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum concurrence, and his majority opinion in BG 
Group, plc v. Republic of Argentina.57 Justice Breyer’s slow climb 
from a dissent, to a concurrence, to a majority opinion in cases 
inviting international legal interpretation and enforcement may 
indicate a broader thread of his influence bringing international 
law into United States courts.58 
B. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE CASES 
Ironically, while even the Marshall Islands’ failed American 
strategy may reconvene a fascinating judicial dialogue, the ICJ 
litigation stands to do nearly the opposite. The following section 
will explore the potential long-term detriment to the ICJ. 
First, a discussion of the Optional Clause outlines the 
Marshall Islands’ anemic jurisdictional claims. The legal merits 
of the Marshall Islands’ arguments are analyzed for the unlikely 
event that they are reached. The Marshall Islands’ treaty-based, 
CIL, and obligation erga omnes arguments are found glaringly 
insufficient. Even if the arguments were legally adequate, the 
Marshall Islands would have little to pin on the United 
Kingdom, and little to pin on India that the ICJ would likely feel 
comfortable laying at the feet of a single state. The Marshall 
Islands’ only hope on the merits, therefore, is a dramatic about-
 
 55. See infra Section III(A). 
 56. E.g., BG Group plc v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014). 
 57. See BG Group, 134 S. Ct.; Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. 
Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring); Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 
536 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 58. See BG Group, 134 S. Ct. at 1198; Kiobel, 113 S. Ct. at 1669; Medellín, 
552 U.S. at 536. 
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face by the ICJ from its 1996 advisory opinion on the use of 
nuclear weapons.59 
1.   A Failure of Procedure: The Optional Clause and the 
Nature of the ICJ’s Compulsory Jurisdiction 
The ICJ’s jurisdiction is comprised of “[a]ll cases which the 
parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the 
Charter of the United Nations or in treaties or conventions in 
force.”60 The ICJ Charter provides an Optional Clause for states 
to embrace the court’s jurisdiction broadly rather than doing so 
piecemeal. Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute characterizes the 
option as recognizing the court’s jurisdiction “as compulsory ipso 
facto and without special agreement.”61 While the ICJ 
characterizes the action of states that accept the Optional 
Clause as “recogniz[ing] the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court,”62 this phrase is misleading. The Optional Clause is 
specific to “other state[s] accepting the same obligation,” and 
constrains the compulsory jurisdiction to legal disputes 
concerning four matters: 
a. the interpretation of a treaty; 
b. any question of international law; 
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would 
constitute a breach of an international obligation; 
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for 
the breach of an international obligation.63 
For the purposes of this Article, “recognizing the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the court” will be referenced as accepting the 
Optional Clause. 
Today, only one third of U.N. member states accept the 
Optional Clause.64 The ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction is 
 
 59. See infra Section II(B)(ii). 
 60. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, ¶ 1, June 26, 1945, 
33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
 61. Id. ¶ 2. 
 62. Press Release 2014/18, supra note 30. 
 63. ICJ Statute art. 36, ¶ 2 (elaborating on other states who accept the 
similar obligations). 
 64. THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A 
COMMENTARY 677 (Andreas Zimmermann et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter ICJ 
Statute Commentary]. 
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“regarded as a failure.”65 Since the ICJ Charter came into force 
nearly sixty years ago, many states found that the terms of the 
Optional Clause were too broad.66 The United States initiated a 
trend recognizing compulsory jurisdiction with reservations.67 
France and India were among the first states to do likewise.68 
Presently, most states that submit to the Optional Clause 
presently do so with explicit reservations.69 
Conveniently, the Marshall Islands accepted the Optional 
Clause one year and one day before initiating these proceedings 
and, in so doing, registered multiple reservations.70 The timing 
of the Marshall Islands’ acceptance demonstrates the length of 
planning that went into the ICJ filings. By the language of the 
ICJ Statute alone, a state could file an Optional Clause 
declaration one day, bring action at the ICJ the next, and 
withdraw its declaration on the third day.71 The ICJ Statute 
merely requires that states party to ICJ litigation have 
declarations in force on the same day.72 Not to be fooled by this 
invitation for “hit-and-run” litigation, the United Kingdom’s 
reservations include a provision that the ICJ will not have 
jurisdiction in any proceeding filed against the United Kingdom 
by a state whose declaration was filed less than twelve months 
prior to filing its application to bring suit.73 
China, France, and the United States each revoked 
acceptance of the Optional Clause within thirty years of 
 
 65. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 261 (3d ed. 
2010). 
 66. New Declarations of Acceptance by France and India of the Jurisdiction 
of the World Court Under Article 36(2) of Its Statute, 1960 DUKE L.J. 84, 84 
(1960) [hereinafter New Declarations]. 
 67. Id. 84–85. The first American reservation was that parties, rather than 
the ICJ, should determine whether a contingency was raised. Id. The matter 
arose in response to Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, 1957 I.C.J. 9, 27 (July 
6). 
 68. New Declarations, supra note 66. 
 69. ICJ STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 64, at 677. See also BEDERMAN, 
supra note 65, at 259. 
 70. Press Release, INT’L CT. JUST., Declarations Recognizing the 
Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory: Marshall Islands, (Apr. 24, 2013), http
://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=MH. 
 71. BEDERMAN, supra note 65, at 260. 
 72. ICJ Statute art. 36, ¶ 2; BEDERMAN, supra note 65, at 260 (explaining 
the ‘hit-and-run’ characterization). 
 73. Press Release, INT’L CT. JUST., Declarations Recognizing the 
Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory: United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=
1&p3=3&code=GB; BEDERMAN, supra note 65, at 260. 
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submission.74 Today, the United Kingdom is the only permanent 
member of the U.N. Security Council that submits to the 
Clause.75 Of the nine nuclear weapons states, only the United 
Kingdom, India, and Pakistan submit to the optional clause. 
While the Marshall Islands brought individual action against 
each of the nine states before the ICJ, proceedings were only 
certified against the three submitting states.76 The other six 
states were invited to accept the ICJ’s jurisdiction strictly for 
these proceedings and have not done so, effectively ending those 
cases.77 
Neither India nor Pakistan has ever been party to the NPT. 
While the Marshall Islands asserts that India and Pakistan are 
bound to the spirit of NPT Article VI through the ICJ’s 1996 
advisory opinion on the legal status of nuclear weapons,78 the 
next section demonstrates that the Marshall Islands’ argument 
does not square with the advisory opinion. 
2.   A Failure on the Merits: Rewriting the 1996 Advisory 
Opinion 
While the Marshall Islands is unlikely to reach argument on 
the merits, given the strength of India and the United Kingdom’s 
prospective arguments against jurisdiction, the Marshall 
Islands would likely fail on the merits anyhow. Because India is 
not party to the NPT, the Marshall Islands could only bring an 
argument of facial treaty obligation against the United 
 
 74. See infra Section III. 
 75. ICJ STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 64, at 676. 
 76. Press Release 2014/18, supra note 30. 
 77. Rep. of the I.C.J., ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/69/4 (Aug. 1, 2014) (“In accordance 
with article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, copies of the applications 
were transmitted to the Governments of the States concerned, but the new cases 
were not entered in the Court’s List and no action will be taken in the 
proceedings against any one of those States unless and until it consents to the 
Court’s jurisdiction for the purposes of the case.”). 
 78. Press Release 2014/18, supra note 30. See also Application Instituting 
Proceedings Against the Republic of India, Obligations Concerning 
Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear 
Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. India), Pleadings, 18 ¶¶ 42–44 (Apr. 24), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/158/18292.pdf [hereinafter Application 
Against India]; Application Instituting Proceedings Against the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Obligations Concerning 
Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear 
Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. U.K.), Pleadings, 31 ¶¶ 87–89 (Apr. 24, 2014), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/160/18296.pdf [hereinafter Application 
Against United Kingdom and Northern Ireland]. 
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Kingdom. To reach beyond the NPT parties, the Marshall 
Islands argues that the United Kingdom and India are bound to 
the principles of the NPT through attenuated constructions of 
obligations erga omnes and customary international law. These 
arguments can only be made by re-writing an advisory opinion 
issued nearly twenty years prior. 
In 1996, the ICJ responded to a request from the United 
Nations General Assembly to address whether “the threat or use 
of nuclear weapons in any circumstance [was] permitted under 
international law.”79 The Marshall Islands contends that the 
advisory opinion expressed “customary international law as it 
stands today” when the court quoted the NPT.80 A brief review 
of the advisory opinion reveals otherwise. 
The opinion unanimously affirmed the group-effort 
language of the NPT Article VI: “[t]here exists an obligation to 
pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations 
leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict 
and effective international control.”81 On the matter of the 
obligation to pursue disarmament negotiations, the court made 
no mention of custom. The prospect of the ICJ leaving such a 
landmark expression to derivation is unimaginable. 
To the contrary, both the ICJ’s findings and lack of findings 
regarding custom were express. The court stated unanimously 
that “[t]here is in neither customary nor conventional 
international law any specific authorization of the threat or use 
of nuclear weapons,” and by eleven votes to three, “[t]here is in 
neither customary nor conventional international law any 
comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons as such.”82 In a seven-to-seven split won by the 
President’s casting vote, the opinion noted an inability to 
definitively conclude “whether the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme 
circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a 
State would be at stake.”83 These holdings demonstrate anything 
 
 79. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Case]. 
 80. Application Against India, supra note 78, at 18 ¶¶ 42–44; Application 
Against United Kingdom and Norther Ireland, supra note 78, at 31 ¶¶ 87–89. 
 81. Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 79, at 226 ¶ 105 (2)F. 
 82. Id. at (2)A, B. 
 83. Id. The opinion further expressed that any threat or use of nuclear 
weapons must comply with pertinent international laws of armed conflict and 
humanitarian law, as well as any pertinent treaties or other legal obligations 
(unanimous), while any threat or use contrary to the United Nations Charter is 
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but an implied expression of custom. 
The Marshall Islands’ erga omnes arguments are hardly 
stronger. Obligations erga omnes are those owed to the entire 
international community.84 The term means “flowing to all.”85 
By contrast, obligations erga omnes partes are more narrowly 
construed as owed to a specific subset of states.86 The ICJ rarely 
names an obligation erga omnes, and expressly declined 
opportunities to do so.87 Here, the Marshall Islands 
inappropriately hangs its erga omnes construction on dicta, 
using a single footnote to cite a single sentence from then-ICJ 
President Bedjaoui’s declaration in the Nuclear Weapons Case.88 
President Bedjaoui noted: 
As the Court has acknowledged, the obligation to 
negotiate in good faith for nuclear disarmament concerns 
the 182 or so States parties to the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. I think one can go beyond that conclusion and 
assert that there is in fact a twofold general obligation, 
opposable erga omnes, to negotiate in good faith and to 
achieve the desired result.89 
This non-binding dicta was expressly the judge’s personal 
opinion and, more importantly, expressly “beyond [the] 
conclusion” of the ICJ.90 
The Marshall Islands’ complaint against India (and 
Pakistan) incorrectly conflates portions of the 1996 advisory 
opinion as stating that every single nation has an obligation erga 
 
unlawful (unanimous). Id. 
 84. Inna Uchkunova, Belgium v. Senegal: Did the Court End the Dispute 
between the Parties?, EJIL: TALK! (July 25, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/
belgium-v-senegal-did-the-court-end-the-dispute-between-the-parties/. 
 85. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Oblatio 
Erga Omnes, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 72 (1996). 
 86. Uchkunova, supra note 84. 
 87. See East Timor (Port. v. Austl.) 1995 I.C.J. 90, 214 (June 30) 
(Weeramantry, J., dissenting) (“Although in this fashion the erga omnes 
principle has played an apparently frequent role in the Court’s recent 
jurisprudence, it has not yet drawn a definitive decision from the Court in 
relation to the manner in which the principle will operate in case of breach.”). 
 88. Application Against India, supra note 78, at 17 n.77; Application 
Against United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, supra note 78, at 30 n.122. 
 89. Marsh. Is. v. India, supra note 80, at 17 n.77; Marsh. Is. v. U.K., supra 
note 80, at 30 n.122 (both citing Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 79, 273–74, 
¶ 23). 
 90. Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 79, at 272. 
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omnes to fulfill the language of the NPT Article VI.91 Just one 
year earlier, in yet another case in which jurisdiction was 
blocked by a state’s reservations to the Optional Clause, Judge 
Weeramantry’s East Timor dissent noted the court’s failure to 
ever find a breach of an obligation erga omnes.92 The ICJ’s first 
erga omnes finding came more than a decade later in Belgium v. 
Senegal, though even that finding was merely obligation erga 
omnes partes.93 
The Marshall Islands construes its finding by conflating a 
slew of phrases from the 1996 opinion as “tantamount” to an 
obligation erga omnes. As with the CIL argument, one could 
hardly imagine the ICJ leaving anything that it believes reaches 
the erga omnes threshold in the shadow of “tantamount” 
equation. The ICJ is “very cautious” when handling erga omnes 
at all.94 One could imagine a future case in which the ICJ may 
hold that testing nuclear weapons violates an obligation erga 
omnes for the protection of citizens and the environment alike, 
drawing on Judge Weeramantry’s dissent to the 1996 advisory 
decision.95 Judge Weeramantry’s East Timor dissent further 
asserted that even the Monetary Gold principle does not block 
 
 91. Application Instituting Proceedings Against the Republic of India, 
Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms 
Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. India), Pleadings, 17 (Apr. 24), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/158/18292.pdf; Application Instituting 
Proceedings Against Pakistan, Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating 
to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. 
Is. v. Pak.), Pleadings, 15 (Apr. 24), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/159
/18294.pdf. 
 92. Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the 
Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. India), 
Application Instituting Proceedings Against the Republic of India, 17 (Apr. 24), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/158/18292.pdf. 
 93. Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. 
Sen.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 422, 449 (July 30) (“These obligations may be 
defined as ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ in the sense that each State party has 
an interest in compliance with them in any given case.”). See also Uchkunoa, 
supra note 84 (citing this case as the first instance of the ICJ finding an 
obligation erga omnes, with only one prior finding by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in 1928). 
 94. Jacob Werksman & Ruth Khalastchi, Nuclear Weapons and Jus Cogens 
Peremptory Norms and Justice Preempted?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 183 (Laurence 
Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999). 
 95. See Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 79, at 517 (Weeramantry, J., 
dissenting) (“The widespread contamination of the environment may even lead 
to a nuclear winter and to the destruction of the ecosystem. These results will 
ensue equally, whether the nuclear weapons causing them are used in 
aggression or in self-defence.”). 
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action to enforce obligations erga omnes.96 Still, the Marshall 
Islands’ attempt to find an existing erga omnes obligation in the 
majority opinions of the advisory opinion is unfounded. 
The Marshall Islands contends that the ICJ’s advisory 
opinion prescribed this phantom custom and obligation erga 
omnes to the world, “not confining its remarks to the States 
Parties to the NPT.”97 But nothing in the 1996 opinion states 
that the obligations of the NPT Article VI extend beyond the 
NPT parties. Alongside interpretations of customary and 
conventional international law, the ICJ affirmed the language of 
NPT Article VI without citing the NPT and without any 
explanation.98 The ICJ’s earlier commentary on the NPT 
consistently referenced NPT obligations relative to treaty 
parties. 
Just before declaring the matters at hand, the final prelude 
discussed the NPT language of Article VI. The ICJ took every 
opportunity to make its comments specific to states party to the 
treaty, using language like “each of the parties,”99 “concerns the 
182 States parties,”100 and “need for all States parties.”101 
Surely, if the ICJ judges intended to say that the NPT Article VI 
language was binding as customary international law, let alone 
erga omnes, they would have said so expressly. Finding a 
universal obligation to Article VI on behalf of parties and non-
parties alike would have conflicted with the ICJ’s unwillingness 
to find custom against the possibility of the threat or use in 
extreme circumstances of self-defense.102 
Even in an opinion critiqued as the ICJ’s attempt to re-
establish authority by creating international law at the end of a 
century during which the court watched its decline in 
prominence,103 the ICJ did not go so far as to assert that every 
 
 96. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.) 1995 I.C.J. 102, 173 (Weeramantry, J., 
dissenting). 
 97. Application Against India, supra note 78, at 18 ¶ 43; Application 
Against United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, supra note 78, at 31 ¶ 88. 
 98. Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 79, at 266 ¶ 105 (2)(E). 
 99. Id. ¶ 99 (quoting the opening language of NPT Article VI, which 
establishes that the obligation is party specific). 
 100. Id. ¶ 100. 
 101. Id. ¶ 103. 
 102. Id. ¶ 105 (2)(E) (“[T]he [c]ourt cannot conclude definitively whether the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme 
circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at 
stake.”). 
 103. See infra Section II. E.g., Kennedy, supra note 36. 
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nation in the world is bound by obligations erga omnes to the 
language of Article VI. Thus, the Marshall Islands has no legal 
footing to argue Article VI obligations from NPT non-parties 
India and Pakistan, whether by custom or obligations erga 
omnes. The sole viable candidate for NPT accountability in the 
ICJ would be the United Kingdom were that measure not futile. 
As District Judge Jeffrey White noted in the order 
dismissing the Marshall Islands’ complaint against the United 
States, the NPT “is silent as to the proper enforcement 
mechanism.”104 Moreover, “[t]he Treaty does not create, and the 
[U.S. District] Court may not enforce, a bilateral obligation.”105 
The NPT did not purport to ban nuclear weapons itself, and the 
Marshall Islands cannot simply argue that failure to negotiate 
an end to the arms race on its own time somehow violates 
measures not present in the NPT. 
In sum, the Marshall Islands stand on perilously little legal 
ground asserting ICJ jurisdiction in the cases against India and 
the United Kingdom, let alone in successfully arguing on the 
merits. Those things established, the greater possible outcome 
of the legal campaign is a threat of the ICJ’s already-waning 
legitimacy. 
III. THE AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY OF THE ICJ IS IN 
JEOPARDY 
Before considering the potential ramifications of the 
Marshall Islands’ legal action, the current pulse of the ICJ must 
be taken. This section identifies the ICJ’s prime in the rearview 
mirror. That backward glance sets the stage for Section IV’s 
accounts of major powers abstaining and withdrawing from the 
Optional Clause. 
The ICJ embodies an attempt to capture a lofty ideal in a 
grandiose palace with beautiful gardens, set back from a quiet 
street in a charming city. Unfortunately, however, the court 
outlived the mid-twentieth century idealism of its inception. The 
ICJ’s Charter fundamentally establishes jurisdiction for 
advisory proceedings and contentious cases.106 Advisory 
 
 104. Marsh. Is. v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1074 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 
2015). 
 105. Id. at 1072. 
 106. See ICJ Statute art. 36. 
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proceedings can hardly be enforced.107 The ICJ’s jurisdiction 
over contentious proceedings of first instance108 encompasses 
cases of special agreement,109 treaty or convention-based 
cases,110 cases in which all state parties submit to the Optional 
Clause for compulsory jurisdiction,111 and cases in which a state 
which does not accept the Optional Clause grants jurisdiction to 
the ICJ on an ad hoc basis for the specific proceeding.112 
In cases of special agreement, “the ICJ is just a glorified 
arbitration panel,” and an unsung arbitration panel at that.113 
Since 1949, the ICJ has heard just eighteen special agreement 
cases, only four of which involved a major power.114 Treaty- or 
convention-based cases are hardly brought either. Since 1946, 
the rate at which states enter treaties with clauses granting ICJ 
jurisdiction has consistently decreased.115 
Given the anemic state of all other forms of ICJ jurisdiction, 
acceptances of the Optional Clause are arguably the gold 
standard of the ICJ’s legitimacy. Compounding misfortune, the 
ICJ does not appear thrilled to ground its jurisdiction in the 
Optional Clause.116 This section contends that the ICJ’s 
legitimacy is already in jeopardy, such that the loss of India’s or 
the United Kingdom’s acceptance of the Optional Clause would 
be a substantial blow. The court’s authority arguably peaked 
nearly a century ago, during its identity as the PCIJ, and recent 
 
 107. See supra Section II(B)(2). 
 108. ICJ Statute art. 36, ¶ 6. Aside from matters of first instance, the ICJ 
Charter also permits jurisdiction to interpret or revise a judgment. Id. at art. 
60. 
 109. ICJ Statute art. 36, ¶ 1. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at art. 36, ¶¶ 2–5. 
 112. See Basis of the Court’s Jurisdiction, (d) Forum Prorogatum, INT’L CT. 
JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=2#2 (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2016). 
 113. Eric A. Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice 9 (John 
M. Olin Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 233, 2004), http://www.
law.uchicago.edu/files/files/233.eap_.icj_.pdf. 
 114. See List of Contentious Cases by Date of Introduction, INT’L CT. OF 
JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3 (last visited Jan. 8, 
2016) (special agreement cases are noted by a forward slash between party 
names). The four instances of major power participation were Minquiers and 
Ecrehos (Fr./U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17); North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. 
Republic Ger./Neth.), 1967 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20); North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. 
Republic Ger./Den.), 1967 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20); and Delimitation of the Maritime 
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can./U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12). Id. 
 115. Posner, supra note 113, at 9. 
 116. BEDERMAN, supra note 65, at 261. 
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gains in state acceptances of the Optional Clause do not begin to 
outweigh the withdrawals. Not to say that there is no hope for a 
change of course; only acknowledging that the ICJ has not seen 
an uptick of legitimacy in years. 
A. THE ICJ’S MOST AUTHORITATIVE DAYS ARE BEHIND IT 
The ICJ is not what the Permanent Court of International 
Justice was in its Roaring Twenties heyday, nor has it 
consistently attempted to maintain the same authority.117 In the 
1920s, the court presented itself “like a national supreme court, 
[and] international law like national law.”118 “Today, this image 
is more common in Europe than in the United States, and in the 
polemics of advocacy than in academic commentary.”119 After 
1945, the ICJ became an organ of the United Nations120—a 
system “languishing now in the chaos of institutional 
proliferation, non-stop budgetary crises and internal reforms.”121 
While the U.N. Charter deems the ICJ its “principal judicial 
organ,”122 submission to the ICJ is entirely separate from 
admission to the United Nations,123 placing the court’s authority 
in a precarious position from the start. Hopes for a “tight 
network” of states submitting to the court’s jurisdiction never 
materialized under the League of Nations or the United 
Nations.124 That said, requiring compulsory jurisdiction of all 
United Nations members would only lead to a parade of 
unenforced judgments.125 Because the ICJ lacks a solid 
enforcement mechanism, the only available choices are a few 
freely consenting states abiding by judgments or unenforceable 
universal jurisdiction. From 1951–2004, there was only one ICJ 
case in which jurisdiction was clearly grounded in the Optional 
Clause, the court sided with the applicant, and the respondent 
 
 117. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 43 (Apr. 9) (separate 
opinion of Judge Alvarez) (characterizing the ICJ as an “international social 
function of a psychological character”). 
 118. Kennedy, supra note 36, at 464. 
 119. Id. 
 120. The Court: History, INT’L CT. OF JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/court/
index.php?p1=1&p2=1 (last visited Nov. 9, 2015). 
 121. Kennedy, supra note 36, at 463. 
 122. U.N. Charter art. 92. 
 123. ICJ STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 64, at 647. 
 124. Id. at 676. 
 125. Id. at 648. 
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complied with the judgment.126 
Even in the words of an ICJ judge, the court is an 
“international social function of a psychological character.”127 
Over the course of the twentieth century, the ICJ has digressed 
to be “one cultural and political institution among others, 
crafting its [nuclear weapons] decision to enhance its legitimacy 
and pull towards compliance, the decision a drop in the ocean of 
world public opinion.”128 
The dawn of specialized courts provides another reason why 
the ICJ lost de facto authority. Fewer cases had reason to come 
to the ICJ once European nations—the ICJ’s great 
champions129—created their own Court of Human Rights with 
far stronger jurisdictional authority.130 Separate courts were 
created for international criminal conflicts, the Law of the Sea, 
conflict in Lebanon, the Rwandan genocide, atrocities in the 
former Yugoslavia, and for international arbitration—none of 
which cede appellate jurisdiction to the ICJ. These courts carved 
authority squarely out of the original vision for the ICJ’s 
authority as the final word on matters of international law. The 
ICJ’s oft-used title as ‘World Court’ would require a remarkably 
involved asterisk to account for every type of international legal 
dispute outside the court’s jurisdiction. 
In sum, the ICJ has no surplus of legitimacy. There is no 
plausible outcome in which the Marshall Islands’ cases will 
increase the piecemeal authority of the ICJ. Cases that 
acknowledge a lack of jurisdiction may not seem significant. To 
the contrary, United States federal courts routinely dismiss 
cases for lack of jurisdiction. Forcing the ICJ to acknowledge its 
lack of jurisdiction over something as intuitively within its 
authority as multilateral treaty enforcement, however, 
highlights the ICJ’s greater failure to maintain the grand 
authority for which it was designed. 
B. GAINS AND LOSSES IN THE GOLD STANDARD OF THE ICJ’S 
LEGITIMACY: SUBMISSION TO COMPULSORY JURISDICTION 
Aside from the ICJ’s failure to launch, and the de facto loss 
 
 126. Posner, supra note 113, at 8 n.14. 
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of jurisdiction in the face of new regional and subject matter-
specific courts, major powers’ late twentieth century 
withdrawals and permitted lapses in their Optional Clause 
declarations further cut against the ICJ’s legitimacy. 
By 1950, shortly after the ICJ Statute came into force, sixty 
percent of states accepted the Optional Clause.131 While the total 
number of states accepting the Optional Clause increased in 
time, the proportion of states dwindled to thirty-four percent.132 
Some see encouragement in gains from former socialist states.133 
Most of the gains came from small states like Barbados, Togo, 
and Costa Rica, though larger players like Germany and 
Australia also signed on in recent years.134 Nevertheless, 
successful invocation of the Optional Clause decreased. Only 
four victories on the merits occurred from 1946–1965, eleven 
from 1966–1985, and three from 1986–2004.135 
From 1951–2005, thirteen state declarations on the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction expired or were terminated and not replaced.136 
Turkey allowed its submission to lapse in 1972,137 as did a 
handful of other smaller nations.138 These losses pale in 
comparison to the Optional Clause revocation of three major 
world powers in the late twentieth century. Section IV recounts 
how three major powers’ Optional Clause declaration 
revocations came to pass, parsing for clues as to how the United 
Kingdom and India may respond to the Marshall Islands’ legal 
action before the ICJ. As this section revealed, the ICJ’s 
legitimacy is in dicey enough shape that either state’s 
withdrawal would be a substantial blow. 
IV. PRIOR REVOCATIONS BY WORLD POWERS 
Some say the ICJ is “being abandoned by the major 
 
 131. Posner, supra note 113, at 8. 
 132. Id. at n.14. 
 133. ICJ STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 64, at 676. 
 134. Id. at 676–77. 
 135. Posner, supra note 113, at 8. 
 136. 59 I.C.J. Y.B. 107, 113 n.1 (2004–2005) (listing declarations from 
Bolivia, Brazil, China, Colombia, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Iran, Israel, 
South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and the United States). 
 137. Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, The ICJ and Compulsory Jurisdiction: 
The Case for Closing the Clause, AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 58 n.9 (1987). 
 138. Anthony Giustini, Compulsory Adjudication in International Law: The 
Past, the Present, and Prospects for the Future, 9 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 213, 237 
(1985). 
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powers,”139 and that “all in all, the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction 
has been regarded as a failure.”140 “The practice under the 
Optional Clause has confirmed the fact that relatively few states 
are inclined to use the [c]ourt.”141 Further, states that revoked 
submission to the Optional Clause were hardly making much 
use of it beforehand. Among the ten state members with the 
largest economies, two have never been respondents in an ICJ 
case beyond the filing stage, let alone brought action 
themselves.142 
On one extreme of the major powers, Russia has never 
accepted the Optional Clause; on the other, the United Kingdom 
hangs on to this day.143 States who maintain declarations 
pursuant to the Optional Clause “are regarded as targets of 
opportunity” by aggrieved nations.144 The other three permanent 
Security Council members, China, France, and the United 
States, each revoked acceptance of the Optional Clause over the 
course of the 1970s and 1980s.145 As discussed infra, China is an 
outlier because its revocation was a function of the rise of the 
People’s Republic of China.146 
In the experience of both France and the United States—
and perhaps in the forthcoming experience of the United 
Kingdom and/or India—a major power walked away from the 
ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction in response to legal action from a 
particularly small nation. These instances illustrate a growing 
 
 139. Posner, supra note 113, at 6. 
 140. BEDERMAN, supra note 65, at 261. 
 141. Giustini, supra note 138, at 236. 
 142. Posner, supra note 113, at 6 (“[C]onsider the countries that currently 
have the ten largest economies: USA, China, Japan, India, Germany, U.K., 
France, Italy, Brazil, and Russia. Four of these states—China, Japan, Brazil, 
and Russia (U.S.S.R.)—have never brought a proceeding, and never been a 
respondent beyond the filing stage.”). See also List of Contentious Cases by Date 
of Introduction, INT’L CT. OF JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index
.php?p1=3&p2=3 (last visited Jan. 8, 2016) (stating that after Posner’s paper 
was written, Japan was a respondent in Australia v. Japan in 2010 and Russia 
was a respondent in Georgia v. Russian Federation in 2008). 
 143. ICJ STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 64, at 676 (stating that “Russia 
(formerly the Soviet Union) . . . have never submitted to the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ according to Art. 36, para. 2”). See also 1 I.C.J. Y.B. 195, 
212 (1946–1947) (statement of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) (“On 
behalf of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, I now declare that 
they accept as compulsory ipso facto . . . the jurisdiction of the Court, in 
conformity with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court . . . .”). 
 144. BEDERMAN, supra note 65, at 261. 
 145. E.g., Giustini, supra note 138. 
 146. See infra Section IV(A). 
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trend of small and relatively weak states dragging major powers 
into the ICJ.147 While facially ironic, the ICJ is blind to state 
size—at least in theory. Counsel for the United States delivered 
this message before the ICJ during the case that led to 
withdrawal from the Optional Clause: 
Nicaragua’s assertion that it is small and weak and the 
United States large and powerful. Nicaragua’s request 
would have this court violate the most fundamental tenet 
of modern international law; the equality of sovereign 
States before the law. That tenet respects the right of the 
weak as well as the powerful, the small as well as the 
large. Indeed, the States best served by a rigorous 
adherence to the principle of equality as well as to the 
rule of law in general are the small and the weak. Any 
departure from those principles ultimately adversely 
affects them the most.148 
In that case, the United States responded initially in the 
precise manner that India is now responding; addressing the 
lack of jurisdiction by arguing that its reservations to the 
Optional Clause barred the proceedings.149 A thorough 
recollection of how France and the United States proceeded in 
the face of contentious proceedings before the ICJ may provide 
insight into how India and the United Kingdom will respond to 
the Marshall Islands. 
 
 147. Posner, supra note 113, at 7. (“In the first twenty year period [1946–
1965], a major power was an applicant in 60 percent of the cases, and a 
respondent in 60 percent of the cases. In the second period [1966–1985], a major 
power was an applicant a little under 50 percent of the time, and a respondent 
a little under 50 percent of the time . . . . In the last period [1986–2004], a major 
power was an applicant in only 13 percent of the cases; a major power was a 
defendant in 100 percent of the cases.”). See also List of Contentious Cases by 
date of introduction, INT’L CT. OF JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.
php?p1=3&p2=3 (last visited Feb. 5, 2015). 
 148. See, e.g., THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS FUTURE ROLE 
AFTER FIFTY YEARS 11 (A.S. Muller et al. eds., 1997). 
 149. See Press Release 2014/22, supra note 33 (“[B]y a letter dated 6 June 
2014, the Ambassador of the Republic of India to the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands informed the Court, inter alia, that ‘India . . . considers that the 
International Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction in the alleged 
dispute.’”). 
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A. CHINA REVOKED ACCEPTANCE FOR COMMUNISM 
In 1946, China accepted the Optional Clause without 
reservation.150 Within a year of France withdrawing its 
acceptance of the Optional Clause, China withdrew as well. 
China’s motivations were the result of a new political regime 
rather than reactive to a particular case. The United Nations 
General Assembly voted to recognize the People’s Republic of 
China as the representative Chinese authority in 1971.151 The 
next year, the Chinese government submitted a letter to the 
United Nations stating that it did not recognize the former 
Chinese government’s statement accepting the Optional 
Clause.152 As other major powers withdrew from the Optional 
Clause in coming years, their circumstances would prove more 
contentious. 
B. FRANCE REACTED TO A CONTENTIOUS CASE FROM NEW   
ZEALAND 
Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, Australia and New 
Zealand made vain efforts to stop French atmospheric nuclear 
weapons tests in the South Pacific.153 The Prime Minister of New 
Zealand wrote the President of France in May 1973, giving 
notice that New Zealand intended to take the matter to the 
ICJ.154 New Zealand made good on its word within a week, 
submitting an initial ICJ application.155 France renounced its 
acceptance of the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction in January 
 
 150. 1 I.C.J. Y.B. 195, 218 (1946–1947). 
 151. Phil C.W. Chan, China’s Approaches to International Law Since the 
Opium War, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 859, 882 (2014). 
 152. 27 I.C.J. Y.B. 46, 52 (1972–1973) (“[B]y letter of 5 September 1972 the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China indicated that it ‘does not 
recognize the statement made by the defunct Chinese government on 26 
October 1946 . . . concerning the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court.’”). See also WEIXING HU, GERALD CHAN, & DAOJIONG ZHA, CHINA’S 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: DYNAMICS OF PARADIGM 
SHIFTS 186 (2000). 
 153. Don MacKay, Nuclear Testing: New Zealand and France in the 
International Court of Justice, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1857, 1863 (1995). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Nuclear Tests Cases (N.Z. v. Fr.), Pleadings 3 (May 9), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/59/9447.pdf. See also MacKay, supra note 153, at 1863 
(“Subsequently, on May 14th, a Request by New Zealand for Interim Measures 
of Protection was lodged with the Court. Australia filed a parallel but not 
identical case.”). 
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1974.156 That May, the French ambassador to the Netherlands 
wrote that France found the ICJ “manifestly” incompetent to 
hear the case.157 The letter further stated that France had no 
intention to appoint an agent in the case, and requested that the 
ICJ withdraw the matter from its case list.158 The ICJ requested 
memorials from each nation on the matter of jurisdiction.159 New 
Zealand complied, and France abstained from participation.160 
Ultimately, the proceedings were rendered moot because France 
seemed to intend to cease its atmospheric tests.161 The resulting 
withdrawal of France’s submission to the Optional Clause was 
permanent. 
Still, France maintains a noteworthy interaction with the 
ICJ since revocation. In 2002, the Republic of the Congo initiated 
proceedings against France, disputing French criminal 
proceedings.162 As in the present case, France was invited to 
submit to the court’s jurisdiction for that case alone. France 
consented exclusively to “the claims formulated by the Republic 
of the Congo.”163 Careful to avoid even the impression of creating 
 
 156. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Memorial of the Republic of France 2, 
http://www.amun.org/final/03/ICJ_France_Memorial.pdf. See also MacKay, 
supra note 153, at 1866 (“France subsequently moved to denounce the General 
Act, and also to remove itself entirely from the compulsory jurisdiction . . . 
months after Australia and New Zealand initiated their proceedings.”). 
 157. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 457, ¶ 4 (Dec. 20) (“By 
a letter dated 16 May 1973 from the Ambassador of France to the Netherlands, 
handed by him to the Registrar the same day, the French Government stated 
that, for reasons set out in the letter and an Annex thereto, it considered that 
the Court was manifestly not competent in the case.”). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. ¶ 6. 
 160. Id. ¶ 6. E.g., Memorial on Jurisdiction and Admissibility Submitted by 
the Government of New Zealand (N.Z. v. Fr.) (Oct. 29), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/59/9451.pdf. See also Oral Arguments on Jurisdiction and 
Justiciability, 1974 I.C.J. 250, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/59/9453.pdf 
(statement of counsel for the Government of New Zealand) (“No representative 
of the French Government is present in [c]ourt.”). 
 161. E.g., Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, supra note 157. 
 162. Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.), Application 
Instituting Proceedings, 3 (Apr. 11), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/129/7067.
pdf. 
 163. Press Release 2010/36, INT’L CT. JUST., Certain Criminal Proceedings 
in France (Republic of the Congo v. France) Case Removed from the Court’s List 
at the Request of the Republic of the Congo (Nov. 17), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/129/16233.pdf (“By a letter dated 8 April 2003 and received 
in the Registry on 11 April 2003, France stated that . . . its consent to the Court’s 
jurisdiction applied strictly within the limits ‘of the claims formulated by the 
Republic of the Congo.’”). See also Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of the French Republic (Consent to the Jurisdiction of the Court to Entertain 
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jurisdiction on any other grounds, France further highlighted 
that “Article 2 of the Treaty of Co-operation signed on 1 January 
1974 by the French Republic and the People’s Republic of the 
Congo, to which the latter refers in its Application, does not 
constitute a basis of jurisdiction for the Court in the present 
case.”164 While the proceedings would have presented an 
intriguing case study in one-off submission to ICJ jurisdiction, 
the Republic of the Congo withdrew its application initiating 
proceedings in 2010.165 France, of course, replied expressing no 
objection to the withdrawal.166 
C. THE UNITED STATES REACTED TO A CONTENTIOUS CASE 
FROM NICARAGUA 
One decade after France, the United States terminated its 
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction amidst similar 
circumstances. The American exit was prompted by a 
contentious case brought by Nicaragua over military and 
paramilitary activity. The United States involved itself in 
overthrowing the leftist Sandinistas regime in Nicaragua, and 
Nicaragua asserted that American intervention violated 
international law.167 Unlike France, the United States made 
preemptive attempts to skirt the matter before withdrawing its 
submission to compulsory jurisdiction entirely. Days before 
Nicaragua filed its ICJ application, the United States informed 
the United Nations Secretary-General that its submission to 
compulsory jurisdiction would not apply to proceedings involving 
Central American nations.168 Once in court, the U.S. team 
compounded its argument by asserting that Nicaragua lacked 
 
the Application Pursuant to Article 38, Paragraph 5 of the Rules of Court) to 
the International Court of Justice (Apr. 8, 2003), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/129/13344.pdf (French only). 
 164. Press Release 2010/36, supra note 163 (“In its letter, France added that 
. . . ‘Article 2 of the Treaty of Co-operation signed on 1 January 1974 by the 
French Republic and the People’s Republic of the Congo, to which the latter 
refers in its Application, does not constitute a basis of jurisdiction for the Court 
in the present case.’”). See also Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
the French Republic, supra note 163. 
 165. See Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.), Judgment, 
2010 I.C.J. 635 (Nov. 16), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/129/16266.pdf. 
 166. Id. 
 167. BEDERMAN, supra note 65, at 233. 
 168. Monroe Leigh, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. United States of America), 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 442, 442 
(1985). 
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standing because the state never submitted to the ICJ’s 
compulsory jurisdiction itself.169 The ICJ was not swayed, and 
issued a judgment that the case was properly brought under 
both the ICJ Statute and a treaty between the United States and 
Nicaragua.170 The United States responded by withdrawing 
from the Optional Clause entirely, technically defaulting on the 
merits of the case, but paying no mind.171 Explaining its 
decision, the U.S. Department of State wrote: 
In 1946 we accepted the risks of our submitting to the 
Court’s compulsory jurisdiction because we believed that 
the respect owed to the Court by other states and the 
Court’s own appreciation of the need to adhere 
scrupulously to its proper judicial role, would prevent the 
Court’s process from being abused for political ends. 
Those assumptions have now been proved wrong.172 
The episode did not conclude solely in the superpower’s 
Optional Clause declaration withdrawal. Procedurally, the 
matter was complicated by the United States’ failed Hail Mary 
to qualify the limits of its Optional Clause declaration. In 
response, a slew of nations subsequently altered the language of 
their own Optional Clause declarations, reserving the right to 
immediate withdrawal from compulsory jurisdiction.173 Those 
nations included Australia, Cyprus, Guinea, Nigeria, Peru, 
Slovakia, Germany, and most notably, the United Kingdom.174 
D.  CONCLUSION ON WITHDRAWALS 
Of the three NPT party nuclear weapon states to submit to 
the Optional Clause, three distinct withdrawal strategies were 
displayed. China withdrew immediately before any 
entanglement could occur at the ICJ. France withdrew nearly as 
soon as a contentious case was filed against it, not waiting for 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. BEDERMAN, supra note 65, at 233. 
 172. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS FUTURE ROLE AFTER 
FIFTY YEARS 117, 129 n.50 (A.S. Muller et al. eds., 1997) (citing Department of 
State Letter and Statement Concerning Termination of Acceptance of ICJ 
Compulsory Jurisdiction, 24 I.L.M. 1742, 1744 (1985)). 
 173. ICJ STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 64, at 680 n.271. 
 174. Id. 
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the ICJ to request jurisdictional submissions.175 The United 
States attempted to untimely alter its reservation, then objected 
to the applicant state’s standing, then waited for the ICJ to 
determine its jurisdiction, and withdrew after losing that 
battle.176 The next sections will estimate where the United 
Kingdom or India may find themselves along this continuum. 
V. WILL THE UNITED KINGDOM WITHDRAW? 
The United Kingdom keeps a low profile before the ICJ. The 
United Kingdom has only been an applicant before the ICJ in 
four cases (excluding special agreement actions), the last of 
which was filed in 1972.177 Likewise, the United Kingdom has 
only been a respondent in four cases (excluding special 
agreement actions), the last of which was filed in 1999, and none 
of which were filed by major powers.178 The United Kingdom’s 
absence from the ICJ may be the result of the European Court 
of Human Rights, displacing much of the United Kingdom’s need 
for a supranational court and providing more reliable 
jurisdiction.179 
This section will begin by exploring the procedural 
weakness of the Marshall Islands’ argument for jurisdiction 
against the United Kingdom, then the weakness of the legal and 
factual merits of the argument, concluding with the likelihood 
that all this argumentation could cause the United Kingdom to 
withdraw its submission to the Optional Clause entirely. 
 
 175. See supra Section IV(B). 
 176. See supra Section IV(C). 
 177. Posner, supra note 113, at 6–7 tbl.2. Those cases were United Kingdom 
v. Albania (1947), United Kingdom v. Norway (1949), United Kingdom v. Iran 
(1951), and United Kingdom v. Iceland (1972). Id. While Posner’s piece is more 
than a decade old, the United Kingdom has not filed any additional applications 
for contentious proceedings before the ICJ since 2004. See List of Contentious 
Cases by Date of Introduction, INT’L CT. OF JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3 (last visited Oct. 17, 2015). 
 178. Posner, supra note 113, at 6–7 tbl.2. Those cases were Greece v. United 
Kingdom (1951), Cameroon v. United Kingdom (1961), Libya v. United 
Kingdom (1992), and Yugoslavia v. United Kingdom (1999). Id. Outside of the 
Marshall Islands’ 2014 filing, no state has filed any additional applications for 
contentious proceedings against the United Kingdom since 2004. See List of 
Contentious Cases by Date of Introduction, supra note 114. 
 179. See ICJ STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 64, at 711 (noting the firm 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights—innately connected to the 
treaties it is charged with enforcing—in comparison to the ICJ’s “consensual 
regime,” which the author characterizes as outdated). 
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Procedurally, this section finds that the United Kingdom’s 
untested reservation to its Optional Clause declaration could be 
interpreted for or against the Marshall Islands; and that a loss 
on the procedural matter of jurisdiction alone could be grounds 
for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal, if following the United 
States’ tactics.  Withdrawal would be considered defaulting on 
the merits, though it would still mean that the judgment would 
be unrecognized by the United Kingdom, furthering the 
tradition of unenforced ICJ judgments.180 
Still, if the ICJ finds jurisdiction, the United Kingdom may 
stick around unthreatened because arguments against the legal 
and factual merits of the case are so strong. Even setting aside 
the precedent that obligations erga omnes cannot be enforced 
when all states allegedly at fault are not party to the 
proceedings,181 the United Kingdom is a model party to the 
NPT.182 
This section finds no footing for the Marshall Islands on the 
factual merits: the United Kingdom’s significant reduction of 
nuclear arms is openly acknowledged by the United Kingdom’s 
government and non-governmental organizations alike.183 
Moreover, there is no way around the United Kingdom’s 
commitment to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, or its signing and 
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty a decade 
before the Marshall Islands did so. If the United Kingdom bows 
out of the Optional Clause, it will likely do so after the 
jurisdiction is decided. 
A. LOSING ON PROCEDURE: THE UNITED KINGDOM’S HISTORY 
BEFORE THE ICJ 
As the only permanent member of the Security Council 
currently submitting to the Optional Clause,184 the United 
Kingdom maintains a sophisticated set of reservations in its 
declaration.185 The aforementioned provision denying 
 
 180. See Posner, supra note 113, at 8 n.14; supra Section III(A). 
 181. See discussion of Monetary Gold infra Section V(C). 
 182. See infra Section V(B). 
 183. Id. 
 184. BEDERMAN, supra note 65, at 259. 
 185. See Chapter 1 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, 4. Declarations Recognizing as Compulsory 
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice Under Article 36, Paragraph 
2, of the Statute of the Court, Texts of the Declarations, United Kingdom of Great 
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jurisdiction in “hit-and-run” cases186 is not the only ace up the 
United Kingdom’s sleeve. As the United Kingdom saw in the 
present case, the Marshall Islands was willing to submit to 
compulsory jurisdiction and wait a year to file action just to 
comply with the opposition’s compulsory jurisdiction 
declaration.187 Not to be beaten at its own game, the United 
Kingdom updated its reservations to compulsory jurisdiction 
eight months after the Marshall Islands filed suit.188 The United 
Kingdom added a reservation excluding compulsory jurisdiction 
in “any dispute which is substantially the same as a dispute 
previously submitted to the Court by the same or another 
Party.”189 
On June 15, 2015, the United Kingdom filed timely 
preliminary objections to the case.190 In accordance with ICJ 
procedure, the details of the objections were not made public, 
though they are assumedly regarding jurisdiction.191 The 
Marshall Islands was granted the standard four months to 
respond.192 
The new reservation seems specially tailored to block the 
Marshall Islands’ case. The Marshall Islands’ filings against the 
United Kingdom, India, and Pakistan are nearly identical.193 
However, because the Marshall Islands filed contemporaneous 
action against all nine nuclear weapons states, the Marshall 
Islands could argue that the United Kingdom’s reservation does 
not apply against its case because of the “previously submitted” 
 
Britain and Northern Ireland, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=I-4&
chapter=1&lang=en#EndDec (last visited Oct. 18, 2015) [hereinafter Texts of 
the U.K. Declarations]. 
 186. See supra Section II(B)(1). 
 187. Id. 
 188. See Texts of the U.K. Declarations, supra note 185. The updated 
reservations were filed on December 31, 2014. Id. 
 189. Id. at ch. 1 § 4. As part of this update, the United Kingdom also stated 
that it would accept compulsory jurisdiction over disputes arising after January 
1, 1984, updating this date from its prior 2004 declaration, which recognized 
disputes arising after January 1, 1974. Id. 
 190. Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the 
Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. U.K.), Order, 
¶ 5 (June 19), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/160/18710.pdf. 
 191. See Rules of Court, supra note 6. 
 192. Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the 
Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. U.K.), Order, 
supra note 190, at ¶¶ 8–9. 
 193. See Press Release 2014/18, supra note 30. 
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language.194 The ICJ found against Japan on similar 
jurisdictional questions within the past decade.195 
If argued, the “previously submitted” language could burn 
the United Kingdom in the same manner as Japan. Because the 
ICJ has had no prior opportunity to interpret the United 
Kingdom’s new reservation, the court’s interpretation for the 
matter at hand cannot be assessed with precision. If the United 
Kingdom’s presumed argument against jurisdiction is denied, 
the nation could imaginably go the way of France or the United 
States, withdrawing entirely from submission to the Optional 
Clause, rather than face a potentially strong ruling from the ICJ. 
Again, because the United Kingdom’s reservations include a 
provision for immediate effect after withdrawal,196 the United 
Kingdom would not be left adrift waiting out its own action as 
the United States was against Nicaragua.197 Again, if the United 
Kingdom does argue against the ICJ’s jurisdiction in any form, 
the strategy not to do so up front, as India did, is curious.198 
B. LOSING ON THE MERITS: THE UNITED KINGDOM’S HISTORY 
WITH THE NPT 
The merits of the Marshall Islands’ case against the United 
Kingdom are just as weak as the procedure. While the Marshall 
Islands can argue NPT breach against the United Kingdom, the 
United Kingdom has arguably acted as a model nuclear weapon 
state in terms of treaty compliance. To public knowledge, the 
United Kingdom has not tested a nuclear weapon since 1991.199 
 
 194. Texts of the U.K. Declarations, supra note 185, at ch. 1 § 4. 
 195. See Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan, N.Z. intervening), 
Judgment, ¶¶ 32–41 (Mar. 31), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/148/18136.pdf 
(rejecting Japan’s contention that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction because the 
dispute fell under one of Australia’s Optional Clause reservations). 
 196. See Texts of the U.K. Declarations, supra note 185, at 2. 
 197. See supra Section IV(C). 
 198. Compare Press Release 2014/22, supra note 33, at ¶ 4 (“[b]y a letter 
dated 6 June 2014, the Ambassador of the Republic of India to the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands informed the Court, inter alia, that ‘India . . . considers that 
the International Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction in the alleged 
dispute.’”) with Press Release 2014/21, INT’L CT. JUST., Obligations Concerning 
Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear 
Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. U.K.), Fixing of Time-Limits for Filing of Initial 
Pleadings (June 19, 2014), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/160/18332.pdf 
(providing no mention of jurisdiction arguments). 
 199. BESFORT T. RRECAJ, POLITICS OF LEGAL REGIMES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 
IN THE ASPECT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 57 (2014). 
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Even the Nuclear Threat Initiative acknowledges that “[t]he 
British government has progressively reduced its nuclear 
weapons stockpile.”200 
In October 2010, British Prime Minister David Cameron 
presented a Strategic Defence and Security Review to 
Parliament.201 Among other things, the study reassessed what 
nuclear arsenal was necessary for “credible deterrence” in light 
of the international order.202 Finding that a smaller arsenal 
would suffice for credible deterrence, the government announced 
plans to reduce its requirement for “operationally available 
warheads” by twenty-five percent, and reduce its overall nuclear 
weapon stockpile, among other actions.203 Even if the Marshall 
Islands were able to argue the non-existent unilateral obligation 
from the United Kingdom to the island nation, the Marshall 
Islands would be hard pressed to argue that the United Kingdom 
has not made sufficient strides to further nuclear non-
proliferation. 
The United Kingdom is a state party to the Treaty Banning 
Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Under Water, known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.204 A December 2014 
statement by the United Kingdom’s Permanent Representative 
to the United Nations in Vienna emphasized the difference of 
NPT interpretation between the United Kingdom and the 
 
 200. United Kingdom Profile, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, 
http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/united-kingdom/ (last updated Oct. 2014) 
(noting that “there has been no attempt to reduce the role of nuclear weapons 
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 201.  CABINET OFFICE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, SECURING BRITAIN IN AN 
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Marshall Islands: 
Some have argued that the way to this goal is to ban 
nuclear weapons now, or to fix a timetable for their 
elimination. The UK considers that this approach fails to 
take account of, and therefore jeopardises, the stability 
and security which nuclear weapons can help to 
ensure. A declaratory ban, or a timetable not 
underpinned by the necessary trust, confidence and 
verification measures, would jeopardise strategic 
stability. None of us would gain from a loss of that 
stability.205 
The representative went on to defend fellow major powers, 
drawing attention to collective reductions of stockpiles between 
the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom alike.206 
Whether viewed alone or relative to other nuclear weapons 
states, short of the argument that the mere continued existence 
of nuclear weapons constitutes an NPT breach, anyone would 
have a hard time arguing that the United Kingdom is 
noncompliant to the NPT—let alone the Marshall Islands’ 
irresponsibly construed obligation erga omnes to “pursue in good 
faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear 
disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective 
international control.”207 
C. THE UNITED KINGDOM’S CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
COMPARED TO PAST OPTIONAL CLAUSE WITHDRAWALS 
Among the Optional Clause revocations, the United 
Kingdom’s present stance is most analogous to the United 
States’ experience. The United Kingdom sent representation to 
a preliminary meeting with the ICJ President in June 2014.208 
That act is distinguishable from French non-engagement. 
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Because the United Kingdom’s Optional Clause declaration has 
such strong reservation language, the state is likely to have 
confidence in its preliminary argument against jurisdiction. 
The United Kingdom chose to stick around for the 
jurisdiction arguments as the United States did, assumedly 
hoping that the case will be dismissed. The United States 
withdrew after unsuccessfully arguing against jurisdiction, and 
the United Kingdom may do the same if its own arguments fail. 
After all, as the only permanent Security Council member 
currently submitting to the ICJ, the United Kingdom’s 
withdrawal from the Optional Clause is not likely to prompt an 
image problem or inconvenience its judicial needs. 
The United Kingdom seems to have little to fear on the 
merits, though the sheer shock of reaching the merits may give 
enough pause for the United Kingdom to weigh the risk of 
continuing to submit to the Optional Clause. While the Marshall 
Islands can only argue attenuated customary international law 
breaches against India or Pakistan, the Marshall Islands can 
compound the CIL case with treaty breach argument against the 
United Kingdom. Luckily, given that there is some small risk to 
reaching the merits, the United Kingdom may be able to argue 
in the alternative against the case. 
Still, if arguments against jurisdiction fail, the United 
Kingdom could also pose a separate argument to avoid the 
merits. In 1954, the ICJ decided Monetary Gold Removed from 
Rome in 1943, known as the “Monetary Gold Case.”209 Italy 
brought action against France, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States for priority ownership of Albanian gold seized for 
World War II restitution.210 Italy’s first request was an opinion 
from the court on jurisdiction.211 At that point, each of the 
defendant states submitted to the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
ICJ. Reservations in Optional Clause declarations were not yet 
in vogue,212 so none were raised. However, India raised an 
interrelated claim against Albania, which did not accept the 
Optional Clause. The ICJ found unanimously that it could not 
adjudicate the claims against Albania absent Albania’s consent 
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to jurisdiction.213 
Then, by a vote of thirteen to one, the court held that it could 
not decide the interrelated issues concerning France, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States without deciding the greater 
issue concerning all the parties.214 Therefore, Albania’s lack of 
Optional Clause acceptance kept the entire case out of the 
ICJ.215 While some could contrast the Nicaragua v. U.S. 
decision, in which the ICJ dismissed the American objection that 
Nicaragua lacked standing for not submitting to the Optional 
Clause, the position of the parties distinguishes the cases.216 
Nicaragua arguably submitted to the international equivalent of 
personal jurisdiction by bringing its case before the ICJ, whereas 
Albania was a respondent whose actions could not be construed 
as submitting to the court’s jurisdiction. 
The United Kingdom could argue the same principle today. 
Given the communal nature of the requirements of the NPT 
Article VI—a commitment to dialogue among nations rather 
than unilateral action—how could the ICJ rule on the United 
Kingdom’s compliance when six of the nine nuclear weapons 
states do not accept the Optional Clause and have not accepted 
the court’s invitations to accept jurisdiction in this matter? 
If the United Kingdom were to make and lose a Monetary 
Gold argument, the state would be foolish not to withdraw its 
Optional Clause declaration. The prospect of being held 
responsible for other states’ collective actions would be a 
dangerous precedent. Luckily, should the United Kingdom feel 
inclined to withdraw consent entirely, the United Kingdom 
currently reserves the right to do so with immediate effect, 
unlike the United States.217 
Bottom line, short of the United Kingdom arguing against 
jurisdiction and the ICJ agreeing, this case will not provide the 
United Kingdom any good reason to maintain Optional Clause 
submission. The United Kingdom may already have one foot out 
the door as is given the absence of any other permanent Security 
Council members from Optional Clause submission. Drawing 
from the French experience, the United Kingdom could rest 
assured that its withdrawal would not foreclose the option of 
submitting to the ICJ’s jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis in 
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matters of optional jurisdiction.218 Optional Clause withdrawal, 
ironically, would simply make such jurisdiction optional. Any 
trouble from the Marshall Islands’ case may be an all-too-
welcome prompting for the United Kingdom to withdraw its 
reservation. 
VI. WILL INDIA WITHDRAW? 
Like France and the United States, and unlike the United 
Kingdom in this case, India responded to the Marshall Islands 
by arguing that one of India’s reservations barred the case.219 
India has a one-for-one record arguing that its reservations bar 
ICJ jurisdiction.220 Procedurally, the battle over jurisdiction in 
Marshall Islands v. India is any state’s game. This section will 
demonstrate the open question of jurisdiction through a brief 
recollection of India’s four contentious cases before the ICJ. 
Procedure undecided, this section addresses the merits of the 
Marshall Islands’ case by considering India’s unique 
relationship with the NPT and with nuclear weapons generally, 
particularly its ongoing development of new nuclear weapons. 
Ultimately, the merits of the Marshall Islands’ case against 
India may be strong enough to prompt India to consider 
withdrawing from the Optional Clause before the ICJ could rule 
against it, though implications for external international 
relations dynamics must be taken into account—particularly 
India’s campaign for a permanent seat on the United Nations 
Security Council. 
A. LOSING ON PROCEDURE: INDIA’S HISTORY BEFORE THE ICJ 
India has been a party to four contentious filings before the 
ICJ. India was a respondent in contentious cases filed by 
Portugal (1955) and Pakistan (1973 and 1999), and an applicant 
against Pakistan in 1971.221 Foreshadowing how India will 
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respond to the Marshall Islands, in each prior instance India 
strove to block the proceedings by arguing that the ICJ lacked 
jurisdiction.222 
India was among the first nations to file a declaration of 
acceptance (and reservations) to the Optional Clause, accepting 
compulsory jurisdiction in 1940.223 Portugal filed its declaration 
on December 19, 1955, and its application against India on 
December 22.224 The case concerned whether India violated 
obligations to Portugal’s right of passage in Indian coastal 
territory.225 Not to be out-filed, India updated its reservations on 
January 7, 1956.226 India made six preliminary objections to 
jurisdiction, including an unsuccessful argument that one of 
Portugal’s reservations was inappropriately retroactive and 
therefore out of line with Article 36 of the ICJ Charter.227 Three 
further objections were based on India’s own declaration, 
including arguments concerning reciprocity and exclusive 
domestic jurisdiction.228 The ICJ voted overwhelmingly to reject 
four of the objections, but joined two to the merits of the case, 
including the matter of exclusive domestic jurisdiction and the 
date of commencement for ripeness purposes.229 The court found 
that it had jurisdiction, but ultimately found that India had not 
violated its obligations to Portugal.230 
India’s single application to the ICJ was unusual. After a 
dramatic falling out over airspace, Pakistan filed a complaint 
before the Council of the International Civil Aviation 
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Organization.231 In 1971, India appealed to the ICJ for a ruling 
on whether the Council was competent to entertain Pakistan’s 
complaint.232 In turn, Pakistan objected that the ICJ was not 
competent to determine the Council’s competence.233 Ultimately, 
the ICJ held that it was competent to determine the Council’s 
competence, and that the Council was authorized to rule on 
Pakistan’s complaint.234 
Pakistan’s filing against India in 1973 alleged genocide 
against Pakistani nationals and was voluntarily dismissed after 
the two nations negotiated in New Delhi.235 Pakistan filed 
against India again in 1999.236 In that case, the ICJ found that 
it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the merits.237 Among other 
reasons, the court relied on India’s September 1974 declaration 
relating to the Optional Clause.238 India’s “Commonwealth 
reservation,” barring jurisdiction in matters brought between 
Commonwealth states, was successfully invoked.239 
Looking forward, one commentator noted, “[g]iven the 
Court’s approach to the Optional Clause and the extremely 
broad reservations contained in India’s Optional Clause 
declaration, it is unlikely that the Court will be able to entertain 
any dispute involving that country, whether as applicant or as 
respondent, based on the Optional Clause.”240 Indeed, for now, 
India may bet that its strong reservations will block the 
Marshall Islands’ case. While India largely hung its hat on the 
Commonwealth reservation in 1999, the Marshall Islands is no 
Commonwealth state. Further, in cases of major powers 
subsequent to India’s last brush with the World Court, such 
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broad deference has not been shown to reservations in Optional 
Clause declarations. In the past decade, Japan lost arguments 
against ICJ jurisdiction.241 
India’s reservations continued to ebb and flow over the late 
twentieth century, more carefully worded as time passed. As one 
commentator characterized India’s reservations, “[s]uch 
exceptions effectively nullify any acceptance of compulsory 
jurisdiction.”242 Another predicted: 
Nowhere has the quantity and density of reservations 
reached the same level as in the case of India, which has 
succeeded in shaping an instrument that will certainly 
prevent any attempt ever to bring an application against 
it, thus converting the act of acceptance into a barely 
veiled act of non-acceptance.243 
India did not withdraw its Optional Clause declaration the 
last time the nation was forced to argue against jurisdiction on 
grounds of its reservations. Why would India withdraw now? 
Because the Court has since construed Optional Clause 
reservations more narrowly, and at least one major power lost 
the jurisdiction argument on grounds of its reservations within 
the past decade. 
If seeking to argue against jurisdiction, India could also 
make the Monetary Gold argument as the United Kingdom may, 
asserting that the ICJ cannot decide a matter of breached 
obligations when some bound parties are not included.244 
Further, without even taking the energy to eviscerate the 
Marshall Islands’ erga omnes construction from the 1996 
advisory opinion, India could analogize to the 2012 Belgium v. 
Senegal case and characterize the obligation as erga omnes 
partes, which seems to be a more comfortable stance for the 
ICJ—arguing that the obligation is specific to the subset of 
states party to the NPT.245 While India may have a strong case 
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against jurisdiction, and even a memory of winning the 
argument before, losing the jurisdiction question may prompt 
India to withdraw its declaration to the Optional Clause for 
sheer desire to avoid entanglement in the merits arguments. 
B. LOSING ON THE MERITS: INDIA’S HISTORY WITH THE NPT 
Luckily for India, given the unsure footing of its potential 
arguments for procedural bars, the Marshall Islands’ merits 
claims are weak. The Marshall Islands’ case against India can 
only be based on attenuated interpretations of custom and 
obligations erga omnes. India’s history relative to the NPT is 
rich. 
India’s position toward nuclear weapons and the 
international community, generally, can best be summarized by 
the mid-twentieth century statement of Dr. Homi Bhabha, 
Secretary of the Indian Department of Atomic Energy under 
Jawaharlal Nehru: “We must have the capability [for nuclear 
weapons]. We should first prove ourselves and then talk of 
Gandhi, non-violence and a world without nuclear weapons.”246 
India has consistently employed strong rhetoric against 
proliferation, all the while developing its own technology and 
stating that non-proliferation should only be discussed when 
every nuclear weapons state intended to do away with their 
weapons. 
India made strong efforts to influence the language of the 
NPT in early deliberations. Negotiations on NPT’s Articles IV, 
V, and VI were insufficient to convince India to sign, and India 
was the only nation to reject the NPT on principle.247 According 
to Indira Gandhi, “India’s refusal to sign the NPT was based on 
enlightened self-interest and the considerations of national 
security . . . nuclear weapon powers insist on their right to 
continue to manufacture more weapons . . . . India does not 
propose to manufacture nuclear weapons.”248 
India’s subsequent nuclear explosion in 1974 was allegedly 
a peaceful one, though twenty-three years later the bomb 
designer stated, “there was nothing peaceful about it. I just want 
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to make clear that the test was not all that peaceful.”249 By then, 
India was stuck. In what Indian officials deemed “nuclear 
apartheid,” the nation could join the NPT as a non-nuclear 
weapons state—the only option available to a nation that tested 
after January 1967, maiming the legitimacy of the nation’s 
proud nuclear program—or remain a rogue, armed outsider.250 
India chose the latter. 
India’s rhetoric again countered its actions two decades 
later. Anticipating the ICJ’s advisory opinion on nuclear 
weapons, India submitted a brief to the ICJ in 1995, strongly 
denouncing the legality of even the “production and manufacture 
of nuclear weapons;” just three years later, India conducted five 
nuclear tests.251 Not surprisingly, Pakistan responded with six 
nuclear tests within two weeks.252 If anyone was in a nuclear 
arms race, patently violating the spirit of NPT Article VI, India 
and Pakistan were. But could a nuclear arms race by non-parties 
to the NPT amount to a violation of international law? 
Despite India’s patent refusal to sign the NPT, seemingly 
anticipating a suit such as the Marshall Islands’ present action, 
India carefully argued that its policies and procedures were in 
line with the NPT. India likewise refused to sign the Rome 
Statute in 1999, in protest that use of nuclear weapons was not 
included as a punishable crime.253 India’s fresh nuclear weapons 
tests weakened its discourse.254 When India chose not to attend 
the 2000 NPT Review Conference, External Affairs Minister 
Jaswant Singh told Parliament that their government 
functioned “consistent[ly] with the key provisions of [the] NPT 
that apply to nuclear weapon states,” notably Article VI.255 
While the five nuclear weapon states acting under the blessing 
of the NPT have each abstained from further testing, and none 
are engaged in a “nuclear arms race,” India continues to build a 
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“credible minimum deterrent” amounting to an arms race with 
Pakistan, and an arguable attempt to establish nuclear 
weaponry on equal footing with China.256 Throughout this 
period, the United States and other world powers 
overwhelmingly accepted India’s nuclear weapons status, even 
outside the blessing of the NPT.257 Any global appeals the 
Marshall Islands would attempt to make against India coloring 
outside the lines of the NPT would likely fall on deaf ears—at 
least the ears of major powers.258 
C. INDIA’S PREDICAMENT RESEMBLES THOSE OF FRANCE AND 
THE UNITED STATES BEFORE THEIR OPTIONAL CLAUSE 
REVOCATIONS 
Long before the Marshall Islands filed suit against India at 
the ICJ, India laid groundwork to defend itself. India’s 
reservations to the Optional Clause were meticulously planned, 
and the nation made clear that even as a non-party to the NPT, 
India found itself in compliance with the NPT’s requirements for 
nuclear weapons states—at least it did fourteen years ago. 
When the day finally came to answer accusations of 
violating international law with its nuclear weapons, India did 
not refute the attenuated erga omnes argument. At first glance, 
this strategy seems odd, as the Marshall Islands’ argument 
seems easily overcome. However, India’s actions could be easily 
explained by an intention to ultimately withdraw from the 
Optional Clause and to keep the company of other world powers 
in how it does so. India argued that this case falls within one of 
India’s reservations to the Optional Clause, just as France 
argued in the Nuclear Tests case and as the United States 
against Nicaragua.259 In this case, India declined to attend an 
initial meeting at the ICJ to flesh out procedural matters,260 just 
as France declined its initial meeting before withdrawal. 
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D. INDIA MAY STAY FOR LEGITIMACY 
Compulsory submission is seemingly dispensable these 
days. Why would India cling to it? Perhaps for legitimacy.261 
India has little footing as a non-party to the NPT and only 
recently gained a permanent ICJ judge for the first time in more 
than two decades.262 India is certainly not holding on to 
European idealism of international law. Even in its history of 
nuclear weapons development, India has proven to be a scrappy, 
self-serving country willing to assert its own opinions and to 
absorb the consequences of not joining the NPT when its 
attempts to influence NPT negotiations failed. More likely, India 
is self-conscious about legitimacy and social capital.263 
India has long wished to join the ranks of the permanent 
members of the U.N. Security Council. Were the matter simply 
left to the current permanent members, India may gain a 
permanent seat with little fanfare. British Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown was on board in 2008, though seemingly without 
the company of the United States, Russia, or China.264 Nicolas 
Sarkozy strongly supported the vision in 2010.265 Barack Obama 
vocalized support during his 2010 visit to India,266 and again 
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when visiting in early 2015.267 China and Russia both appear to 
have warmed to the idea.268 Still, the current permanent 
members would not make the decision in a vacuum. An effort to 
give India a permanent seat would require an amendment to the 
U.N. Charter, requiring a vote of two-thirds of the General 
Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of all U.N. members, 
including every permanent Security Council member.269 As 
India gains pivotal progress toward a permanent seat, its 
hesitance to rock the boat before another United Nations organ 
would be understandable.  
VII. CONCLUSION: BETTER LUCK LEAVING THE ICJ FOR 
DOMESTIC COURTS (OR, WHAT THE MARSHALL 
ISLANDS GOT RIGHT) 
Given the French and American experiences withdrawing 
from the Optional Clause, an imminent British or Indian 
withdrawal is wholly imaginable. While either state may remain 
in order to make a statement, there is no imaginable scenario in 
which the Marshall Islands could win either case on the merits. 
A finding of obligations erga omnes or customary international 
law would be unfounded and unprecedented; India has never 
been party to the NPT, and if nothing else, the Monetary Gold 
precedent should terminate these proceedings.270 In any 
probable outcome, the ICJ will likely lose an additional shred of 
legitimacy. 
As the world waits to learn how India and the United 
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Kingdom will respond to the Marshall Islands, the ICJ’s 
legitimacy hangs in the balance. If the number of states 
submitting to the Optional Clause is truly any standard of the 
ICJ’s legitimacy, and if either of these nations withdraws in the 
face of these proceedings, the ICJ will be one step closer to 
illegitimacy. The irony of this possible outcome, coupled with the 
futility of the Marshall Islands’ arguments on the merits, begs 
the question of what end game the Marshall Islands envisioned 
at the start. Even if the cases never reach the merits, and the 
ICJ is forced to articulate one or two more instances in which it 
lacks jurisdiction to resolve interstate disputes, a sting of 
illegitimacy will be felt. The ICJ was designed to thrive in this 
arena. 
The probable backfiring of these proceedings highlights the 
need for a practical analysis of where the ICJ is headed, whether 
its initial ideals are worth salvaging, and whether revitalization 
is even feasible. As the ICJ cases falter, the world should look 
back to the Marshall Islands’ American case for a new way 
forward. Despite a seeming destiny for failure before the 
International Court of Justice, the Marshall Islands may 
reconvene an impactful and long forgotten method of 
counteracting major powers’ exceptionalism in international 
law—seeking relief in the powers’ own courts.271 
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